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The Complexity of Using the Patent Standards under TRIPS for the Promotion of 
Domestic Industrial Development in Developing Countries in the Absence of Local 
Working Requirements: Rethinking the Role of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation in Intellectual Property Standard-Setting 
 
Abstract 
 
This article confronts the most basic question, which is whether in its traditional legislative 
intent the principle of patent working requirements would as an instrument of government 
policy in the mist of global value chains definitely guarantee industrial growth for developing 
countries and LDCs. The author argues that globalisation has promoted an increasing 
fragmentation of production, that is, in a dynamic economic efficiency and open trade 
environment, much of manufacturing today is trade in components from different sources, and 
seeking to produce all of them locally would be contrary to division of labour and undermines 
the very existence of the WTO’s mandate to preserve the basic principles and to further the 
overriding objectives underlying the multilateral trading system, which is to reduce barriers to 
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations. 
Therefore, a key distinction in thinking about policy is that as an instrument of government 
policy the patent working requirement is, on its own, insufficient, less prudence and not the 
smartest route to secure rapid socio-economic growth, as countries have more to lose from a 
confrontational scenario of implementing patent working requirements, and more to gain when 
they join the global supply chain to exploit its numerous opportunities. 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The grant and enforcement of patents are governed by national regimes,1 and also by 
international treaties,2 where those treaties have been given effect in national laws.3 Some 
patent regimes impose certain independent conditions on patentees including patent working 
requirements.4 The obligation to work the invention has two different meanings: generally, the 
first means that the patent owner has a duty to make the patented product or the product made 
with the patented process available to potential consumers; specifically, it means that the patent 
                                                 
* Thaddeus Manu, Research Scholar, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London. 
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1 Frederick Abbott, Thomas Cottier and Francis Gurry, International Intellectual Property in an Integrated World 
Economy, 2nd edn (Aspen Publishers, 2011) at 602, commenting that the sovereignty of each national government 
within its own territory is the paramount principle by which the international legal and political order was 
constituted. 
2 See, International Treaties and Conventions on Intellectual Property. Available at: 
<http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/iprm/pdf/ch5.pdf> [Accessed 30 August 2016]. 
3 See, Article 1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 1C, The Legal Texts: The Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
4 Michael Halewood, “Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at 
International Law” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 2, 243, at 244.  
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owner is obliged to supply the national market with the patented product or the product made 
with the patented process that has been manufactured in the territory of the granting country.5  
 
The second meaning is known as “the local working requirement” or “patent working 
requirements”. It follows an industrial policy rationale, according to which patents are granted 
to promote the establishment of domestic industries by means of imports of foreign technology, 
and local invention and innovation.6 According to this rationale, patents are not simply granted 
to promote invention and innovation, or in other words, patents are granted to promote national, 
rather than foreign invention and innovation.7 Customarily, the obligation to exploit has 
actually meant the obligation to locally exploit the invention, which means that making the 
patented products available through importation would not satisfy that obligation.  
 
Making the argument from the patent working requirement viewpoint, it follows that local 
manufacture of patented inventions can be deemed the most efficient way to transfer 
technology, which in itself has always been one of the primary objectives of the patent system.8 
By this implication, the exclusive rights granted to patentees come with an affirmative duty on 
the parts of patentees to manufacture their patented inventions or in a similar vein apply the 
patented processes locally, which will mean, by default, that the granting of compulsory 
licences will be justified.9 These transfers may serve a number of the policy goals of less 
developed economies: employment creation, industrial and technological capacity building, 
national balance of payments, and economic independence.10  
 
Bodenhausen settled the traditional legislative intent behind the granting of patent rights,11 
except that this was before the current patent regime under the Agreement on Trade-Related 
                                                 
5 “Refusals to Licence IP Rights – A Comparative Note on Possible Approaches” (Geneva, World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) prepared by the Secretariat, August of 2013) at 9, Box 2. 
6 id. 
7 id. 
8 Ulf Anderfelt, International Patent Legislation and Developing Countries (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971) 
at 7, citing the [English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, Chapter 21, Jac. 1, c. 3 “An Act concerning Monopolies 
and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the Forfeitures”] as mandating the working of the patent grant. Graham 
Dutfield and Uma Suthersanen, “Global Intellectual Property Law” (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2008) at 24.  
9 Charles Twinomukunzi, “The International Patent System: A Third World Perspective” (1982) 22 Indian 
Journal of International Law 1, 31 at 42. 
10 Halewood, note 4 at 246. 
11 Georg Bodenhausen, “Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, as Revised at Stockholm in 1967” (Geneva, WIPO Publication No. 611(E) BIRPI, 1969: WIPO 
reprinted, 1991) at 71. 
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Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),12 which appeared to usher in a new patent 
regime in accordance with trends in the globalisation of knowledge goods.13 From this 
conceptual position, it is clear that critical perspectives on the patent working requirements 
emerged in the earliest patent regimes centuries ago and this was based strictly on the principles 
of direct industrial application of the patented inventions within the territory of the patent 
granting country’s economy.14 
 
However, contemporary analyses of the legal contours of the working requirements have 
echoed some arguments, which appear to render their validity wholly inconsistent with the 
general provisions in relation to standards concerning the availability, scope and use of patents 
within the current global patent regime under the TRIPS Agreement.15 The argument follows 
that because of the inherent conflict of the patent working requirement with international free 
trade, if all World Trade Organisation16 members were to impose that patent owners could only 
discharge themselves from the obligation to work their inventions by means of direct local 
manufacture, then international trade of patented goods would cease completely.17  
 
The TRIPS Agreement has adopted language that accommodates the obligation to make the 
patented articles (or the articles manufactured with the patented process) available on the 
national market with national treatment of goods (rather than of inventors).18 The relevant 
language of Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement in part reads: ‘...patents shall be available 
and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced’. Actually, that language 
can be seen as transposing into the field of IPRs the principle of national treatment of goods, 
as set out by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).19 
 
                                                 
12 “The TRIPS Agreement”, note 2. 
13 Molly Jamison, “Patent Harmonization in Biotechnology: Towards International Reconciliation of the Gene 
Patent Debate” (2015) 15 Chicago Journal of International Law 2, 688 at 690. 
14 Halewood, note 4 at 251, citing the English Statute of Monopolies, 1623 and the Venetian Patent Act of 1474. 
15 Enrico Bonadio, “Compulsory Licensing of Patents: The Bayer-Natco Case” (2012) 34 European Intellectual 
Property Review 10, 719 at 724, stating that was contrary to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, which states 
that: ‘a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’.  
16 The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, the Legal Texts: The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 
(1994). 
17 “Refusals to Licence IP Rights”, note 5 at 9. 
18 id. Box 2. 
19 Article III.4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 194. Note that GATT 
1947 is now incorporated in GATT 1994. 1867 U.N.T.S. 187. 
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This is, however, a matter of contention among WTO members, and this is worsened by the 
fact that the members considered the legal scope of the patent working requirements during the 
negotiation of TRIPS, but still, the Agreement failed to explicitly include any provisions on 
local working requirements.20 In the absence of this, some scholars have crafted various 
arguments either in favour of, or against, the legality of patent working requirements pursuant 
to TRIPS.  
 
Those in favour of the position that TRIPS allows for patent working requirements generally 
point to Article 2(1) of TRIPS, which incorporates Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883,21 which recognises failure to work as an abuse of 
the patent right and subject to Article 31 of TRIPS. They argue that such an abusive behaviour 
in the exercise of patent rights remains a substantive ground for granting compulsory licences.22 
This argument is further enhanced if one reads into it the interpretation provided by the 
members during the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (Doha Declaration).23  
 
While the members of the WTO maintained their commitment in the TRIPS Agreement, they 
settled that in as much as the national regime of the member taking this legislative action 
permits, ‘Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine 
the grounds upon which such licences are granted’.24 Arguably, this includes the patent 
working requirement grounds, although the jurisprudence under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU)25 has also failed produce the true interpretation of the working patent 
requirements. The dispute between the United States (US) and Brazil26 regarding the 
consistency of Article 68 of Brazil’s Law No. 9279 of 14 May 1996 with TRIPS, was settled 
                                                 
20 Thomas Cottier, Shaheeza Lalani and Michelangelo Temmerman, “Use It or Lose It: Assessing the 
Compatibility of the Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Local Working Requirements” 
(2014) 17 Journal of International Economic Law 2, 437 at 451. 
21 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, 21 UST 1583, 828 UNTS 305 (as 
revised). 
22 Jayashree Watal, Implementing the TRIPS Agreement on Patents: Optimal Legislative Strategies for 
Developing Countries, in Owen Lippert (Ed.), Competitive Strategies for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
(Vancouver, Fraser Institute, Vancouver, 1999) at 111. 
23 See the full texts of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm> [Accessed 29 August 2016]. 
24 ibid. para. 5(b). 
25 Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 2, the Legal Texts: The Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). 
26 Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1, 
G/L/385, IP/D/23, Jun. 8, 2000. 
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by the parties.27 India, expectedly invoked a patent working requirement under Section 84(1) 
of the Indian Patent Act, 197028 in 2012 as the basis for granting a compulsory licence to 
Natco,29 and to date this decision remains unchallenged within the WTO DSU system.30 
 
On the other hand, some scholars have already rejected this proposition.31 They tend to refer 
to Article 27(1) of TRIPS, which unambiguously requires that patent rights shall be enjoyable 
on the basis of non-discrimination as to whether products are imported or locally produced.32 
The argument that follows is that the importation of patents can satisfy local working 
requirements either partially or fully.33 This contention is reasonable if one considers the fact 
that the standard line in support of TRIPS stems from recognition of the contemporary 
significance of the knowledge economy, and private IP rights as a major component of 
international trade.34 This is clearly an offshoot off globalisation.  
 
A recent empirical exploration by Cottier, Lalani and Temmerman has confirmed this 
reasoning. They concluded that the tenets of modern international trade law requires equal 
conditions for trade.35 Thus, promoting international trade and development for all countries is 
a fundamental objective of the WTO,36 except that this notion is sometimes disputed.37 
Moreover, while TRIPS recognises the underlying public policy objectives of national systems 
for the protection of IP, including developmental and technological objectives, to compel 
foreign establishment operations in their national territories via the conduits of patent working 
                                                 
27 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4, 
G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1, Jul. 19, 2001). 
28 Act 39 of 1970. 
29 The Controller General of Patents and the Order: Mumbai-India. (Decision on Mar. 9, 2012). 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/compulsory_license_12032012.pdf [Accessed 1 September 2016].  
30 Thaddeus Manu, “Building National Initiatives of Compulsory Licences: Reflecting on the Indian 
Jurisprudence as a Model for Developing Countries” (2015) 14 Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 
1, 23 at 48. 
31 Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th Edn., 
2012) at 433. Cottier, Lalani and Temmerman, note 20 at 460. 
32 Carlos Correa, “Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries” (2001) 3 Tulane Journal of 
Technology and Intellectual Property 1, 1 at 7.  Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss, A Neofederalist 
Vision of TRIPS (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012) at 43. Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime 
of Patent Rights (3rd Edn. Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2010) at 174. 
33 Antony Taubman, A Practical Guide to Working with TRIPS (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011) at 
104. Martin Adelman and Sonia Badia, “Prospects & Limits of the Patent Protection in the TRIPS Agreement: 
The Case of India” (1996) 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 3, 507 at 517. 
34 Understanding the WTO (Geneva, World Trade Organisation, Fifth Edition, 2015) at 39. 
35 Cottier, Lalani and Temmerman, note 20 at 459. 
36 “The Preamble and Article III of the WTO Agreement”, note 19. 
37 William Cline, Trade Policy and Global Poverty (Washington DC., Peterson Institute, 2004) at 264, accusing 
the WTO of widening the social gap between rich and poor. 
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requirements may increase rather than reduce distortions and impediments to international 
trade, and such national measures may become barriers to legitimate trade.38  
 
This is because the nature of what can be considered international trade has changed completely 
with the growing interconnectedness of production processes across many countries.39 The fact 
is that the international fragmentation of production through global supply chains has been a 
commercial reality with the advent of globalisation and fundamental to this is the spread of 
international outsourcing of trade in parts and components of goods from different countries.40 
 
Importantly, one of the stated goals of the TRIPS Agreement was “to reduce tensions arising 
from IP protection”.41 One of the tensions that existed prior to the inception of TRIPS into the 
international trading system was the failure of developed countries to transfer technology to 
developing countries.42 In order to ease this tension, TRIPS includes a number of provisions 
on this, which perhaps form a significant part of the objects and principles of the Agreement.43 
This was in absolute satisfaction of developing countries’ concerns, many of whom see 
technology transfer as part of the bargain in which they have agreed to protect IP rights.44  
 
Now, one of the central purposes of TRIPS, as per its objective provision in Article 7, is that 
the protection of IP should contribute to technical innovation. The TRIPS Agreement also 
embodies an additional important objective, which is that the technological innovation 
generated as a result of IP protection should be disseminated and transferred. The intent 
expressed in TRIPS Article 7 is that both producers and users should benefit, and that socio-
                                                 
38 “The Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement”, note 2. 
39 Paul Krugman, Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences (Washington DC., Brookings Institute 
Papers on Economic Activity, 1995) at 334. 
40 Richard Baldwin, Global Supply Chains: Why they Emerged, Why they Matter, and Where they are Going, in 
Global Value Chains in a Changing World, (Eds.) Deborah Elms and Patrick Low (Fung Global Institute, 
Nanyang Technological University and World Trade Organisation, 2013) at 24. 
41 Carlos Correa and Duncan Matthews, The Doha Declaration Ten Years on and Its Impact on Access to 
Medicines and the Right to Health (Discussion Paper, United Nations Development Programme, Bureau of 
Development Policy, December 2011) at 7. 
42 Swaraj Barooah, “India’s Pharmaceutical Innovation Policy: Developing Strategies for Developing Country 
Needs” (2013) 5 Journal of Trade Law and Development 1, 150 at 158, noting that developing countries were 
beginning to demand access to technology. 
43 The Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement, Articles 7 and 66(2). 
44 Frederick Abbot, “The WTO Trips Agreement and Global Economic Development - The New Global 
Technology Regime” (1996) 72 Chicago-Kent Law Review 2, 385 at 387. Thirukodikaval Nilakanta Srinivasan, 
“Doha Round of Multilateral Negotiations and Development” (Stanford, CA: Stanford Centre for International 
Development Working Paper No. 252, 2005) at 6. Nuno Pires de Carvalho, “The TRIPS Regime of Trademarks 
and Designs” (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011) at 134. 
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economic welfare should be enhanced for WTO members. However, many developing 
countries argue that access to technology is still an issue.  
 
This complexity is compounded by the fact many of these countries may lack the proper 
economic structures to use technology to promote socio-economic growth.45 Another issue that 
raises a number of questions is the adaptation of new knowledge and the application of such 
knowledge to further innovation after the knowledge has been accessed by a recipient. This 
question touches upon basic preconditions such as skills, inadequate capacity building, and 
incentives for further innovation.46  
 
The Development Agenda (DA)47 under the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO)48 was meant to provide technical assistance in building adequate capacity on this.49 
However, WIPO’s technical assistance has been criticised for a variety of reasons including 
that the organisation lacks an understanding of the needs of developing countries and LDCs, 
and even direction in its own development-related agenda.50  
 
Nevertheless, it is also the case that this argument ignores the fundamental view that the basic 
infrastructure necessary to put technology into real or result-oriented practice is generally 
lacking in LDCs, and notably, the idea of transferring technology that cannot be used to 
promote socio-economic growth may be pointless.51 Failure to understand the complexities 
surrounding technology transfer may lead to inaccurate policy conclusions, which may 
potentially evaluate the patent working requirements as a critical part of the policy mix to 
promote socio-economic growth, and this may be deceiving.52  
                                                 
45 WIPO: Transfer of technology (Geneva, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Fourteenth Session, 
WIPO Doc. SCP/14/4 REV.2, 26 October 2011) at 52. 
46 ibid. at 58. 
47 The WIPO Development Agenda (WO/GA/31/11, 2007). Available at: <http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/agenda/recommendations.html> [Accessed 1 July 2016]. 
48 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation 1976 (as amended in 28 September 
1979. 21 UST. 1749, 828 UNTS 3). 
49 “An External Review of WIPO Technical Assistance in the Area of Cooperation for Development” (Geneva, 
Final Report submitted on 31 August 2011) at 90. 
50 Carlos Correa, Formulating Effective Pro-Development National Intellectual Property Policies, in Trade in 
Knowledge, Christopher Bellman, Graham Duffield and Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz (Eds.) (London, Sterling VA., 
Earthscan, 2003) at 214. 
51 “WIPO: Transfer of technology”, note 45 at 53, emphasising the importance of the absorptive capacity of the 
recipient of the technology, that is, the ability of the recipient to evaluate and use the technology effectively. 
52 Keith Maskus, Encouraging International Technology Transfer (Geneva, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs 
and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 7, 2004) at 1, observing that some observers argue that 
technology objectives are best met by refusing to protect the rights of foreign firms to profit from such transfers, 
or at least to sharply restrict their exclusive right to exploit technology. 
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Therefore, this article confronts the most basic question, which is whether in their traditional 
legislative intent patent working requirements would in the midst of global value chains 
definitely guarantee socio-economic growth for developing countries and LDCs. A key 
distinction in thinking about policy is whether developing countries and LDCs should seek to 
invoke the patent working requirements more narrowly as an instrument of government policy 
to promote domestic industrial growth or the WIPO should assist developing countries to focus 
on joining the global value chain system and exploit its numerous opportunities. 
 
Consequently, while the article advances a thesis in support of the validity of patent working 
requirements under TRIPS, it also draws from the concept of global value chains and 
confidently adds a new dimension to the argument, which brings into question the normative 
relevance of the legislative principle of patent working requirements in the age of globalisation 
as a definitive instrument of government policy in promoting domestic socio-economic growth 
like it did in the ancient patent regime.  
 
This contention is founded on the evidence that globalisation has promoted an increasing 
fragmentation of production; that is, in a dynamic economic efficiency and open trade 
environment, much of manufacturing today is trade in components from different sources, and 
seeking to produce them all locally would be contrary to division of labour and undermines the 
very existence of the WTO’s mandate to preserve the basic principles and to further the 
overriding objectives underlying the multilateral trading system, which is to reduce barriers to 
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.  
 
The conclusion drawn from the hypothesis is based on the common sense position that 
imposing overall “closure rules”, such as patent working requirements is, on its own, 
insufficient, less prudent and not the smartest route to secure rapid socio-economic growth in 
the global value chain-led global economy to promote socio-economic growth because 
developing countries have a lot more to gain from the exploitation of opportunities in the global 
value chain system, and they have more to lose from a confrontational scenario of 
implementing patent working requirements.  
 
II. The General Objection to the Patent Working Requirements under TRIPS 
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There is considerable tension as far as the TRIPS Agreement is concerned when it comes to 
the general principles applicable to the working of patented inventions locally.53 The confusion 
surrounding whether or not WTO members have the right to demand that patentees work their 
patented inventions or similarly apply the processes locally centres on the interpretation of 
certain substantive provisions within the TRIPS Agreement, such as Articles 27 and 28.54 
While the controversy in this area of law is not new,55 it remains an unresolved matter.56  
 
Although some scholars have in the past argued for the need for the TRIPS Agreement to be 
reviewed to clarify the misunderstanding surrounding the legislative principle of local working 
requirements,57 a unique aspect of the WTO is that there already exists a dispute resolution 
mechanism,58 the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), established through Article 2 of the DSU, 
to resolve disputes regarding legal matters arising out of the WTO Agreements including 
TRIPS.59  
 
The WTO’s procedure for resolving trade disputes under the DSU is a central element that is 
vital for enforcing the rules and therefore for providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system to ensure that trade flows smoothly.60 Since the inception of the 
TRIPS Agreement, increasing numbers of IPRs disputes have been brought before the DSU 
system.61 Nonetheless, one issue that has not been completely argued or decided before the 
DSB is that of WTO members’ right to demand that patentees satisfy the legal obligation to 
work their patented inventions locally in the patent granting or protected country. 
 
                                                 
53 Michael Blakeney, “Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property: A Concise Guide to the TRIPS Agreement” 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) at 3-6, examining disagreements over pharmaceutical patents between the US 
and Korea, India, Thailand and Brazil from 1987 through 1992. 
54 Review of TRIPS, International Trade Daily News (BNA) (International Trade Reporter, 9 June 1999) at D7. 
55 Theresa Beeby Lewis, “Comment, Patent Protection for the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Survey of Patent Laws 
of Various Countries” (1996) 30 Journal of International Law 4, 835 at 859, citing pharmaceutical patent disputes 
between the US and Singapore, Costa Rica, China, Egypt, Korea and Thailand. 
56 Sara Ford, “Compulsory Licensing Provisions under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents” (1999) 
15 American University International Law Review 4, 491 at 943. Drugs: United States, EU Resistance to 
Compulsory Drug Licensing Draws Health Care Fire, International Trade Daily News (BNA) (International Trade 
Reporter, 29 March 1999) at D8. 
57 Richard Marschall, Note, “Patents, Antitrust, and the WTO/GATT: Using TRIPS as a Vehicle for Antitrust 
Harmonization” (1997) 28 Journal of Law and Policy International Business 4, 1165 at 1190. 
58 WTO DSU, note 28. 
59 “World Trade Organisation”, note 19, proclaiming in Article III, Section 3 that one of the functions of the WTO 
is to administer the dispute settlement. 
60 Article 3(2) of the DSU. 
61 Robert Hudec, “The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years” (1999) 
8 Minnesota Global Journal 1, at 17. 
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While the members affirmed their adherence to the principles of the DSU in relation to disputes 
hitherto applied under Article XXIII of GATT 1947,62 despite the fact that the legality of patent 
working requirements appears to be in dispute, there is no interpretation within the WTO DSU 
to clarify the legal position pursuant to TRIPS. As already stated, the WTO dispute between 
the US and Brazil would have provided us with the true interpretation;63 however, the parties 
settled the matter.64 
 
The most consistent argument is that patent working requirements would violate Articles 27 of 
TRIPS in respect of the non-discrimination standards relating to patents and covers both 
substantive principles as well as specific issues of enforcement that are generally applicable to 
patents.65 At face value, reading the contextual part of Article 27(1) of TRIPS alone may 
suggest that the general context of TRIPS provides that members may not impose working 
requirements, which would seek to eventually discriminate against patents as to the place of 
invention, and whether products are imported or locally produced.66  
 
The claim under this provision is that Article 27(1) of TRIPS subsequently redefined 
“working” to include the possibility of being adequately satisfied by importation.67 In other 
words, the conclusion often drawn from this controversy is that Article 27(1) of TRIPS 
provides that local manufacture be defined as being made available in the country, including 
through imports, rather than through direct local manufacture in the territory of protection.68 
Moreover, with this understanding, a member state must establish a patent system that does not 
separate the place of invention and whether products are imported or locally produced.69  
 
In addition, Article 28(1) of TRIPS establishes the basic right of the patent holder, which is to 
preclude others without consent from the acts of making, using, selling, offering for sale or 
                                                 
62 Article 3(1) of the DSU. 
63 “Request for Consultations by the United States”, note 26.  
64 “Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution”, note 30.  
65 “The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries” (New York and Geneva: prepared by the UNCTAD 
Secretariat, UNCTAD/ITE 1, 1996) paras. 111−114. 
66 ibid. Pires de Carvalho, note 32, commenting that domestic discriminatory treatment of patents would 
generally conflict with Article 27(1) of TRIPS, which transposes the principle of national treatment of goods in 
GATT 1947 Article III(4). 
67 Kim Jordan, “International Application of a Domestic Intellectual Property Protection Strategy: Extending a 
Predatory Litigation Strategy to the European Community” (1995) 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Technology 
Law Journal 2, 373 at 400. 
68 Thiamanga Kongolo, Unsettled International Intellectual Property Issues (Kluwer Law International: Alphen 
aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, 2008) at 6. 
69 Pires de Carvalho, note 66. 
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importing the patented product, or using the patented process - including importing products 
made using the process.70 Exclusivity ensures that the patent holder may fully exploit the 
invention and obtain a reasonable reward for the patented invention.71 Article 28(2) further 
provides that patent owners shall have the right to assign or transfer the exclusive patent rights, 
or to enter into voluntary licensing arrangements.72 The terms of licensing agreements are open 
to negotiation subject to domestic laws or international practices.73  
 
Complementing the legal restrictions imposed by TRIPS on patent working requirements are 
Articles 3, 4 and 5 of TRIPS, which included the fundamental rules on national and most-
favoured-nation treatment of foreign nationals. These obligations cover not only the 
substantive standards of protection but also matters affecting the availability, acquisition, 
scope, maintenance and enforcement of IP rights as well as those matters affecting the use of 
IP rights specifically addressed in the Agreement.74 While the national treatment clause forbids 
discrimination between a member’s own nationals and the nationals of other members, the 
most-favoured-nation treatment clause forbids discrimination between the nationals of other 
members.75  
 
The inclusion of the foregoing principles within the TRIPS Agreement makes it unlawful for 
WTO members to discriminate against foreign nationals and products involved in trade, and 
the most restrictive interpretation of these provisions is that any form of differential treatment 
would be inconsistent with WTO members’ obligation not to discriminate.76 However, it is 
                                                 
70 “Dispute Settlement: World Trade Organisation” (New York and Geneva, The United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.18, 2003) at 21, para. 2.6.4. See, USC Title 35 [Jul. 19, 
1952], ch. 950, 66 Stat. 803; Pub. L. 97-164 (as amended) Section 271(d)(4), providing that: ‘whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention ... infringes the patent’. See also, In the US 
Supreme Court Decision in Dawson Chem. Co. v Rohm & Haas Co., 448 US 176, 215 (1980) in which the 
judgment recognised the long-settled view that the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others from 
profiting by the patented invention. 
71 Laurence Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The Contested Evolution of the 
Transnational Legal Order on Access to Medicines, in Transnational Legal Orders, Terence Halliday and 
Gregory Shaffer (Eds.) (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 314. 
72 Cynthia Ho, “A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health” (2007) 82 Chicago Kent 
Law Review 3, 1469 at 1479. 
73 Jerome Reichman and Catherine Hasenzahl, “Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions” (Geneva, 
UNCTAD-ICTSD Issue Paper No. 5, 2004) at 13. 
74 “Implications of the TRIPS Agreement on Treaties Administered by WIPO” (Geneva, WIPO Publication No. 
464 (E), 1996) at 8. See also, “Guide to WTO Law and Practice” (Cambridge, WTO Analytical Index 2 Volume 
Set, Legal Affairs Division World Trade Organisation, Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 1026-1033. 
75 Id. 
76 Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, “Diversifying Without Discriminating: Complying with the 
Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement” (2007) 13 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 2, 
445 at 450. 
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worth emphasising that this controversy became an issue after the conclusion of the TRIPS 
Agreement.77 Before that point, the idea or legislative practice of patent working requirements 
was rarely questioned or rejected.78  
 
III. Patent Working Requirements under the Paris Convention 1883 
 
The Paris Convention is the starting point for outlining the legal provisions that frame any 
discussion on the legality of patent working requirements in patent regimes. As part of the 
general principles of international law, the Paris Convention formally recognises the right of 
its members to demand as an affirmative duty that patented inventions be worked locally.79 
Under its Article 5(A)(2), members could grant compulsory licences to prevent any abuse that 
might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, expressly 
mentioning as an example “failure to work”. The reason is straightforward: because abuse 
means the use of rights in a way contrary to the objectives of the law, the notion of abuse is 
symbiotically linked to the very objectives that the law sets out for patents.80  
 
Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention does, however, place limitations on the extent to which 
members should grant compulsory licences to remedy failure to work. In other words, the 
possibility of granting compulsory licences under the Paris Convention is subject to a number 
of substantive conditions as set out in Article 5(A)(4).81 For example, the patent holder must 
have sufficient time to work the patent (defined in Article 5(A)(4) as a period of four years 
from the date of filing of the patent application or four years from the date of the grant of the 
patent, whichever period expires last), and a compulsory licence will not be issued if the patent 
holder has legitimate reasons for not working the patent; however, the members’ discretion in 
doing so is not limited inasmuch as these essential conditions are followed.82  
 
                                                 
77 Remarkably, the advent of the TRIPS Agreement has not led many countries to amend their local working 
provisions. In Europe, for example, as recently as 1997 only the Netherlands and Switzerland had changed their 
laws. See, Bernd Hansen and Fritjoff Hirsch, Protecting Inventions in Chemistry: Commentary on Chemical Case 
Law under the European Patent Convention and the German Patent Law (Berlin, Wiley-Vch: Weinheim, 1997) 
at 406-407. 
78 Brian Mercurio and Mitali Tyagi, “Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question 
of the Legality of Local Working Requirements” (2010) 12 Minnesota Journal of International Law 2, 275 at 
283. 
79 id. 
80 “Refusals to Licence IP Rights”, note 5 at 9. 
81 Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention. 
82 Mercurio and Tyagi, note 78 at 282. 
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This key provision is important, given that the immediate exploitation of the patented invention 
in all countries where patents are granted for the invention is generally impossible.83 The idea 
of providing a space of four years was to allow patentees sufficient time to organise work or 
licence another to do so in the granting countries concerned. In addition, this is refused if the 
patentee justifies his or her inaction with legitimate reasons.84  
 
Notably, the Paris Convention has been subject to several subsequent revisions over the years,85 
but throughout the history of the Convention its member states’ freedom to take legislative 
measures such as compulsory licences to remedy failure to work have remained virtually 
unchanged.86 More significantly, the Paris Convention is still in force today, and it is part and 
parcel of the TRIPS Agreement. The relevant provisions are to be found in Articles 2(1) of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which relate, respectively, to the Paris Convention. Article 2(1) of TRIPS 
incorporates by reference Articles 1 through 12 and 19, of the Paris Convention, 1967, stating 
that the Agreement “shall comply” with those Articles. Article 2(2) states that the 
TRIPS Agreement shall not ‘derogate from existing obligations that members may have to each 
other under the Paris Convention’. Within this spirit, a returning question is whether TRIPS 
still forbids patent working requirements.  
 
IV. Reconciling Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention with Article 31 of TRIPS 
 
Compulsory licensing is one of the flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement. This 
instrument finds its legal basis in Article 31 of TRIPS. Complementing the language under 
Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, the TRIPS Agreement does not use the term “compulsory 
licensing”. However, in reference to patent usage Article 31 does allow for “use without 
authorisation of the right holder”, thus allowing a compulsory licence to be issued.87 The 
general purpose of Article 31 of TRIPS is to allow any WTO member state to grant a 
compulsory licence to protect the public interest.88  
                                                 
83 Bodenhausen, note 11 at 70. See, Samuel Oddi, “The International Patent System and Third World 
Development: Myth or Reality?” (1987) 1987 Duke Law Journal 5, 831 at 862. 
84 id.  
85 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “The International Patent System: The Revision of the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property” (Geneva, Switzerland, Report by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, (UNCTAD) Secretariat, Provisional Agenda Item 4 - U.N. Doe. 
TD/B/C.6/AC.3/2 (1977) at 4. 
86 Halewood, note 4 at 251. 
87 ibid. Ford note 56. 
88 Richard Hunter, “Compulsory Licensing: A Major Issue in International Business Today?” (2009) 11 European 
Journal of Social Sciences 3, 370 at 372. See also, Jon Matthews, “Renewing Healthy Competition: Compulsory 
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The TRIPS Agreement does not expressly refer to the right of member states to grant 
compulsory licences on the patent working requirement grounds. Nonetheless when Article 31 
of TRIPS is read along with Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention in relation to Article 2(1) of 
TRIPS this allowance is implied. Moreover, there is no explicit evidence within the TRIPS 
Agreement that the content of Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention has been modified, except 
to say that where the law of a member allows for it, that member is free to grant compulsory 
licensing on any grounds.89 As a simple example, TRIPS does not specifically stipulate what 
constitutes the abuse of IP rights unlike Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention, which 
provides failure to manufacture as an example. 
 
Put differently, Article 31 of TRIPS does not specifically pursue any grounds as the bases of 
which compulsory licences can be issued.90 In fact, with the single exception of semiconductor 
technology, Article 31 of TRIPS does not limit the grounds on which WTO members can 
implement compulsory licences.91 However, the provision describes two situations where 
compulsory licences can be used, but the two situations remain within the remit of national 
laws of member states - where the licence is required to address an overriding public interest, 
and where the patent rights are being used in an anticompetitive manner - although without 
limiting the possibility of, or WTO members’ independence in,  granting compulsory licences 
on any other substantive grounds.92  
 
Notably, Article 31 of TRIPS contains a detailed set of substantive conditions and procedural 
requirements that must be satisfied when members are to grant compulsory licences.93 
Therefore, WTO members are left with a very broad scope of action in regard to the grounds 
on which they can grant compulsory licences.94 These include the need to authorise such use 
                                                 
Licenses and Why Abuses of the TRIPS Article 31 Standards Are Most Damaging to the United States Healthcare 
Industry” (2010) 4 The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship and the Law 1, 119 at 125. 
89 “The Preamble of Article 31 of TRIPS”.  
90 Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting Analysis and Negotiating History (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1998) at 165. 
91 Article 31(c). 
92 Carlos Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 311. 
93 ibid. Gervais, note 90. 
94 German Velasquez and Pascale Boulet, Globalisation and Access to Drugs: Perspectives on the WTO/TRIPS 
Agreement (Revised: Geneva, World Health Organisation, 1999 (Doc. Reference WHO/DAP/98.9) at 35. 
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on its individual merits;95 the need to be non-exclusive;96 the need for a prior request for a 
licence to the patent holder on reasonable commercial terms; and the obligation to pay adequate 
compensation.97 Therefore, in as much as the procedural requirements and other substantive 
conditions are met, the TRIPS Agreement does not limit members’ possibility to grant 
compulsory licences on any grounds, such as failure to work.98 So, taking the Article 31 
provision together with Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention, it is obvious that the TRIPS 
Agreement leaves members with wider discretion as to the granting of compulsory licences 
and the grounds on which to do so. 
 
VI. Compulsory Licensing as the Right of the State: The Objectives and Principles of 
TRIPS to Promote Public Interests 
 
Importantly, Article 8, entitled “Principles”, recognises the right of members to adopt measures 
to prevent the abuse of IP rights, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions 
of the TRIPS Agreement, including to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance 
to their socio-economic and technological development. Professor Correa shares this premise 
and while deploying the interpretative value of Article 8 of TRIPS, he argues that IP cannot be 
regarded in isolation from broader national development policies.99 Article 8 of TRIPS 
confirms the broad and unfettered discretion that member states have to pursue public policy 
objectives, particularly the industrial application of patents to promote the development of 
sectors vital to members’ economic orientation.100 
 
Talking about technological development and national development policy, Article 7, entitled 
“Objectives”, provides the validating mechanism for the protection of IP to generate 
technological innovations and for the transfer and dissemination of technology in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare. More importantly, the patent system rests on an 
instrument of domestic public policy as opposed to anything else. The Preamble to TRIPS 
                                                 
95 Article 31(a) of TRIPS. 
96 Article 31 (d) of TRIPS. 
97 Article 31(h) of TRIPS. 
98 Carlos Correa, “Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for Developing 
Countries” (Geneva, Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) Working Papers 5: South 
Centre, October 1999) at 9.  
99 Correa, note 92 at 12. 
100 “The Resource Book on TRIPS and Development by the UNCTAD-ICTSD” (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) at 126-127. See also, Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, “A Comparative Analysis of Policy 
Space in WTO Law” (Munchen, Germany, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax 
Law, Research Paper Series No. 08-02, 2008) at 36-38. 
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stipulates a straightforward notion that IP policymaking shall be member-driven taking into 
account different levels of development,101 a consensus shared by the members during the 2007 
World Intellectual Property Organisation’s General Assembly, concerning IP norm-setting 
activities.102   
 
Therefore, if the patent working requirement can be used to achieve the objectives of TRIPS 
and its principles regardless of the non-discrimination principle under Article 27(1) of TRIPS, 
this will be justified. Importantly, reasonableness as a matter of law favours an understanding 
that any interpretation of the term “discrimination”103 pursuant to Article 27(1) of TRIPS 
should require greater attention as discrimination may not be the same as differential 
treatment.104 In fact, under a normal meaning of the term “discrimination”, treating different 
cases differently is not discrimination.105 As this ambiguity came to a head in the Canada - 
Patents Products case,106 the Panel acknowledged that: ‘Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide 
exemptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain product areas’.107 
 
The Doha Declaration provides the relevant context that influences any reading of Article 27(1) 
of TRIPS in relation to the consistency of patent working requirements with the Agreement. 
Thus, the Doha Declaration has settled this controversy, and has provided the correct 
interpretation. In providing the true interpretation in relation to TRIPS and considering Article 
27(1) – a provision that some refer to as limiting members’ possibility of patent working 
requirements – the WTO members, without excluding any grounds, confirmed that: ‘Each 
member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds 
upon which such licences are granted’.108 This proves that patent working requirements are 
legitimate and consistent with TRIPS, and nothing in the light of the Agreement would, in fact, 
preclude the possibility of any developing country or an LDC demanding that patentees satisfy 
                                                 
101 Peter Yu, “The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement” (2009) 46 Houston Law Review 4, 979 at 
1008. 
102 Available at: <http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf> 
[Accessed 27 August 2016] Cluster B, para. 15. 
103 Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Report of the WTO Dispute Panel: WT/DS/114/R, 17 
March 2000) para. 7.98.  Ibid. Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, note 76 at 450. 
104 Compare Id. at para. 7.94.  Ibid. at 7.101, listing issues arising in cases of de facto discrimination.  
105 ibid. Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, note 76. 
106 “Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products”, note 103. 
107  ibid. at para. 17.92. 
108 ibid. para. 5(b).  
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the working requirements to manufacture the patented products or similarly apply the processes 
locally. 
 
VII. Global Value Chain: A Dominant Feature of Today’s Global Economy 
 
As a matter of empirical logic, a handful of countries today maintain patent working 
requirements within their national regimes,109 while a considerable number of countries have 
introduced legislation that accommodates a system of patent importation or permits a patent 
owner to import patented inventions from another country where the owner holds a patent on 
the same invention.110 This is relevant, as the radical change in the nature of globalisation 
means that not all patented inventions can be practicably or economically manufactured 
locally. The “Global Value Chain” is the theory that will help us to understand the foregoing 
logic.111 This concept teaches us that the production of goods and services has become 
“globalised”.112  
 
Importantly, the theoretical foundation of this concept, as advanced by Kaplinsky and Morris, 
holds the reasoning that there is a ‘full range of activities that are required to bring a product 
from its conception, through its design, its sourced raw materials and intermediate inputs, its 
marketing, its distribution and its support to the final consumer, and final disposal after use’.113 
In the trade literature, this phenomenon will provide a logical understanding in thinking about 
manufacturing in today’s global economy as an economic activity containing a series of value 
added stages, or steps where most organisations engage in hundreds, or even thousands, of 
activities in the process of converting inputs to outputs.114  
 
In other words, today’s global economy is characterised by global value chains, in which 
intermediate goods are traded in fragmented and internationally dispersed production 
                                                 
109 Article 68 of Brazil’s Law No. 9279 of 14 May 1996. Section 84(1) of the India Patent Act 1970. 
110 Cottier, Lalani and Temmerman, note 20 at 441, citing Ghana, Jordan, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa and 
Uruguay. 
111 Collaboration, Innovation, Transformation: Ideas and Inspiration to Accelerate Sustainable Growth - A 
Value Chain Approach (Geneva, The World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2011) at 3 & 5. 
112 Dorothy McCormick and Hubert Schmitz, Manual for Value Chain Research on Homeworkers in the 
Garment Industry (Sussex, Institute for Development Studies, 2001) at 17. 
113 Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris, A Handbook for Value Chain Research (Prepared for the International 
Development Research Centre, 2001) at 4. 
114 Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage (New York, The Free Press, 1985) at 11. 
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processes.115 They are part of a new global economy in which connectedness matters more, 
and have become important end-markets, where trade in components as opposed to trade in 
finished goods is the commercial norm.116 
 
The Business Guide to the World Trading System, published by the International Trade Centre 
and the Commonwealth Secretariat, placed this in a simple context by stating that, ‘virtually 
all manufactured products available in markets today are produced in more than one 
country’.117 The United Nations (UN) even acknowledges that the fragmented nature of 
‘international trade in manufactured goods is one of the factors underlying the changing 
geography of industrialisation’.118 
 
The proliferation of internationally joined-up production arrangements, that is, global value 
chains, has changed our economic and political landscape in fundamental ways. Advances in 
technology and an enabling policy environment have allowed businesses to internationalise 
their operations across multiple locations in order to increase efficiency, lower costs and speed 
up production.119 Businesses today look to add value in production where it makes most sense 
to do so; indeed, this has become a key element of corporate competitiveness.120 For their part, 
some policymakers may recognise that participating in global value chains will bring value and 
opportunities to their people and economies, if they foster friendly policy frameworks.121 
 
The global value chain has revolutionised development options, as several developing 
countries are increasingly participating in international trade,122 and the volume of exchange 
goods between nations is contributing to the generation of wealth for all.123 They can also be 
an important mechanism for developing countries and LDCs to enhance productive capacity, 
                                                 
115 World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development (Geneva, 
UNCTAD, United Nations Publication Sales No. E.13.II.D.5, 2013) at x. 
116 Cottier, Lalani and Temmerman, note 20 at 452. 
117 World Trade Report 2013: Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade (Geneva, World Trade Organisation, 
2013) at 78 
118 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, (Geneva, Official 
Records of the General Assembly. A/42/427, 4 August 1987) at para. 9. 
119 Victor Fung, Governance through Partnership in a Changing World, in Global Value Chains in a Changing 
World, (Eds.) Deborah Elms and Patrick Low (Fung Global Institute, Nanyang Technological University and 
World Trade Organisation, 2013) at xix. 
120 ibid. Krugman, note 39 and the accompanying text.  
121 ibid. Fung, note 119. 
122 P.S. Senguttuvan, Fundamentals of Air Transport Management (New Delhi, Excel Books, 1st Edn., 2006) at 
11. 
123 id. 
 19 
by increasing the rate of adoption of technology and through workforce skill development, thus 
building the foundations for long-term industrial upgrading.124 
 
According to the UN, value-added trade contributes about 30 per cent to the Gross Domestic 
Products (GDP) of developing countries and LDCs, significantly more than it does in 
developed countries (18 per cent).125 Global value chains thus have a direct impact on the 
economy, employment and income and create opportunities for development.126 The fact is 
that globalisation has benefited the world economy despite much discontent about its 
potentially disruptive and disadvantageous consequences.127 
 
Thus, notwithstanding the existence of a sizeable empirical study that investigates the 
opportunities in the global value chains, literature on trade in value-added from the global value 
chains can be quite technical, as complementarity relationships in wealth generation among 
countries from the global value chains system can complicate an economic analysis. For 
example, former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy noted, ‘the statistical bias created by 
attributing commercial value to the last country of origin perverts the true economic dimension 
of the bilateral trade imbalances. This affects the political debate and leads to misguided 
perceptions’.128 To this end, many policymakers in developing countries and LDCs may lack 
an understanding of the importance of this field and how to take an advantage of the global 
value chain system to pursue domestic socio-economic growth.  
 
This is where WIPO can come in to assist developing countries and LDCs to specifically 
develop productivity strategies and support structures to maximise the advantages of the global 
value chain system.129 Although WIPO has done terrific work towards the creation of national 
networks of Technology and Innovation Support Centers targeting developing countries and 
                                                 
124 ibid. “World Investment Report 2013”, note 115. 
125 id. 
126 id. 
127 World Trade Report: Trade in a Globalising World (Geneva, World Trade Organisation, 2008) at xiv. 
128 Pascal Lamy, “Made in China’ Tells us little about Global Trade” (Financial Times, 24 January 2011. 
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129 Maskus, note 52 at 5, suggesting that international organisations can serve as a forum for negotiating 
additional rights and obligations at the international level in order to reduce impediments to international 
technology transfer.  
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LDCs,130 and in presenting countries with practical examples and experience,131 these projects 
are general in nature and do not purposely target the opportunities in the global value chain 
system. 
 
VIII. WIPO Capacity Agenda: Joining the Global Value Chain System to Realise Socio-
Economic Growth 
 
As the global patent rules evolve, their impact must be properly understood if domestic policies 
are to be based on relevant public interests in order to implement IP regimes that serve local 
needs.132 De-industrialisation is a pervasive trend among developed countries, as they attempt 
to delocalise certain production segments of firms in search of lower production costs.133 This 
includes the movement of new technologies and know-how,134 and this presents an opportunity 
for developing countries to industrialise.135  
 
It is therefore imperative for developing countries and LDCs policymakers to develop a better 
appreciation of how the economy fits into global production chains.136 The supply chain 
presents opportunities for shared learning, technology transfer, and minimisation of risk in 
investments and attracts foreign investment to drive efficiency in innovation, and more 
advanced operations such as research.137 There is a place for every country. Now, developing 
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countries and LDCs can join the global value system rather than having to invest decades in 
building domestic industries from scratch.138  
 
In other words, joining supply chains to promote socio-economic growth will be drastically 
faster and better than resting any hope on patent working requirements as a vehicle for building 
local industrial development.139 In most instances developing countries and LDCs would find 
it cheaper and faster to acquire foreign technologies than to develop them with domestic 
resources.140 This is because while technology transfer may be the primary goal of patent 
working requirements, local working is not the only means to achieving technology transfer.141  
 
Technology transfer can be achieved through market channels other than local working through 
foreign direct investment, which may be expected generally to transfer technological 
information that is newer or more productive than that of local firms.142 It can be achieved 
through non-market channels, including reverse engineering and imitation.143 A third major 
channel is technology licensing, or joint ventures, which may be done either within firms or 
between unrelated firms at arm’s-length.  
 
In this context, international firms may provide technically superior production information 
through licensing.144 This is where WIPO could play a key role in its DA mandate by helping 
developing countries and LDCs to first of all understand the opportunities in the global value 
chain system,145 and secondly, to provide policymakers with the technical capacity in enacting 
complementary policies to leverage gains while enhancing their competitiveness, attracting 
investment, and inserting themselves into global value chains.146 
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Therefore, for reasons of technical economic inefficiency, critical thinking will teach us that 
the global value chain system can help developing countries to mitigate issues of socio-
economic welfare by enhancing the ability of firms, in particular small medium enterprises, to 
have access to technology when they partner with foreign firms rather than unnecessarily 
implementing complex and confrontational patent working requirements as a shortcut to local 
industrial development.147 Foreign firms may be expected, in principle, to deploy to their 
subsidiaries in recipient countries technological information that is newer or more productive 
than was the case with incumbent firms.148  
 
This can be a more solid foundation for building socio-economic growth than patent working 
requirements, which will probably not generate sustainable economic benefits anytime soon. 
More importantly, commonsense shows that the goal of securing access to patented inventions 
solely for the purposes of use may outweigh the other goals of the working requirement, such 
as the development of a domestic industry, with the result that importation will be a sufficient 
form of the working requirement to satisfy this particular goal.149  
 
In this situation, a country may also relinquish the prospect of local manufacturing if local 
manufacturing would result in higher prices for and therefore de facto less access to the 
patented invention in the country.150  That is, where meaningful economies of scale were out 
of reach, it may be illusory if the implementation of the patent working requirement does not 
benefit countries where manufacturing may be technically feasible but not economically 
viable’.151 For instance, the experiences of Brazil and India provide an illustrative example on 
this point.  
 
In the case of pharmaceutical products, the Brazilian experience of providing universal access 
to HIV/AIDS treatment reveals that it is not feasible for any developing country to embark on 
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local manufacture.152 Added to this logic is that better quality and cheaper import products can 
be obtained through imports than through local working.153 Importantly, empirical evidence 
shows that in some developing countries imported products, such as medicines may be less 
expensive than locally manufactured ones.154 More importantly, India currently provides the 
world with one-fifth of low-cost generics, of which about half are sent abroad to other 
developing countries and Africa is a major beneficiary.155   
 
IX. Conclusion  
 
This paper has examined the extent to which developing countries and LDCs could use the 
current patent standards under the legal landscape of TRIPS as tools for promoting socio-
economic growth. The essential element of this analysis has been to confront the most basic 
question, which is whether, in their traditional legislative intent, patent working requirements 
would, in the midst of global value chains, definitely guarantee socio-economic growth for 
developing countries and LDCs. 
 
A key distinction in thinking about policy is whether developing countries should focus on 
joining the global value chain system or seek to invoke patent working requirements more 
narrowly as an instrument of government policy to promote domestic industrial growth. The 
analysis of this paper has importantly demonstrated that economic inefficiency in developing 
countries and LDCs together with the altered structure of internationalisation supports the 
viewpoint that patent working requirements may not be the smartest option for securing 
domestic socio-economic growth. In other words, the way that patent working requirements 
are conceived in their traditional scope requires conceptual adjustment to reflect the modern 
trade reality. 
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The findings suggest that global value chains have become a dominant feature of today’s global 
economy where much of the manufacturing of goods and trade is done in parts and components 
from different sources. It also facilitates the distribution of a wide range of manufactured goods 
that are produced in different parts of the world to global markets.156 Therefore, seeking to 
produce them all locally would be contrary to the division of labour and undermines the very 
existence of the WTO’s mandate to preserve the basic principles and to further the overriding 
objectives underlying the multilateral trading system, which is to reduce barriers to trade and 
to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations. 
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